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ABSTRACT
The effects of information heterogeneity (heterogeneous vs. homogeneous),
representational role obligations (some vj. none), and group composition (male
vs. female) on group process and decision making were studied using a simula-
tion involving nuclear power plant siting. Heterogeneity of information was
shown to inhibit social-emotional responses. The presence of representational
role obligations resulted in higher satisfaction with the task, lower satis-
faction with the decision, and lower perceived member effectiveness than the
absence of role obligations. Female groups took longer to reach agreement and
were less task-oriented in their responses than male groups. Implications of
the results for the assembly and leadership of task forces are discussed.

Effects of Information Heterogeneity and Representational Roles on
Group Process and Outcome
Groups are o±:ten formed to solve problems which require information un-
available to a single individual. Nevertheless, information heterogeneity may
be detrimental to group process and outcome* London (1975) compared hetero-
geneous groups in which members were given information derived from different
sources with homogeneous groups in which each member had information derived
from all sources. Heterogeneous group members perceived lower influence, lower
individual effectiveness, and a less favorable group atmosphere than homogen-
eous group members although there were no differences in quality of outcomes.
In both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, participants were instructed to
arrive at a decision that would maximally benefit all concerned. The present
study extends this research by examining the effects of membership differences
in information and vested interests on group process and outcome.
Vidaar (1971) studied differences between negotiation in which group mem-
bers had representational role obligations and discussion in which members did
not have differing obligations. Representational role obligations were found
to be generally detrimental to negotiator performance. Other investigators
(e.g., Blake & Morton, 1961; Klimoski & Ash, 1974; Haccoun & Klimoski, 1975)
report that factors which enhance the negotiator's commitment or accountability
to his constituency, such as arguing for a fixed position in a win-lose situa-
tion, prolong the negotiation process.
Both information heterogeneity and representational role obligations
should increase the task demands placed on group members. Therefore, member
differences in information and roles should have a negative effect on such
process and outcome variables as the frequency of task-oriented and positive
social-emotional responses (e.g., giving information and showing solidarity),

the time it takes to reach consensus, and member perceptions of interpersonal
influence, effectiveness, and satisfaction.
METHOD
Subjects
The participants were 60 male and 60 female students enrolled in an intro-
ductory course in organizational behavior. The subjects received course credit
for their participation. They were organized into 20 male and 20 female three-
member teams and randomly assigned to experimental treatments.
Decision Task
Subjects were required to rank order 10 geographical areas in terms of
their suitability as sites for nuclear power plants in a variation of the task
used by London (1975). In the homogeneous information condition, all subjects
received information related to environmental interests, governmental regula-
tions, and the power industry. In the heterogeneous information condition,
each subject received information stemming from only one source. Therefore,
both homogeneous *.nd heterogeneous group*, had the potential to use the same
information in arriving at equally high quality solutions. Nevertheless, the
amount of information given to each manber of the homogeneous groups was three
times greater than that given to each member of the heterogeneous groups. To
test for possible confounding effects of amount of information, a pilot study
compared homogeneous discussion groups which differed in amount of information
given to each subject. Several combinations of information were used in dif-
ferent groups in the low quantity condition to control for content. No sig-
nificant differences emerged in length of time to reach consensus and member
perceptions of influence, satisfaction, and effectiveness. This finding re-
duces the viability of amount of information as a competing explanation for

differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups in the present study,
but it does not completely eliminate it.
Procedure
The experimenter introduced the subjects to the. problem by reading a brief
lecture describing a nuclear power plant in contrast to a traditional fossil
fuel plant. In the representational role condition, the subject was asked to
argue for a solution that would be best for one vested interest group: the
ecology movement, a government regulatory agency, or a power company in the
area. Role assignment corresponded to the information given to the subject
in the heterogeneous information groups whereas it was assigned randomly in
the homogeneous information groups. In the nonrepresentational role condition,
subjects were instructed to recommend to the power commissions the rank order
of geographical areas that would be maximally beneficial to all concerned
rather than to the unique interests of any one reference group. The informa-
tion was then distributed and the subjects were allowed time to study the in-
formation and maps and individually rank order the geographical areas out-
lined on a map.
Following the individual decision making, all groups were instructed that
tl.ey would have up to 30 minutes to discuss the issue as a group and try to ar-
rive at a consensus on the order of the favorability of the geographical areas.
Members were then told that the discussion would be interrupted every five min-
utes for members to collect their thoughts and individually record the rank
order each believed the group should recommend. The instructions emphasized
that there was no requirement that all members =igree at the end of 30 minutes.
Alternately, groups could reach agreement in less than 30 minutes, at which
time they would be given instructions for the remainder of the group period.
In this way, the possibility of leaving early was eliminated as an incentive

4for speedily reaching consensus. When the group reached consensus (or ac the
end of six five-minute periods), a post-discussion questionnaire was completed
by each participant.
Dependent Measures
Bales' (1950) Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) was used to measure group
member behavior. Each of two pairs of trained raters observed and raced half
the groups in each of the eight conditions from behind a one-way mirror. The
average reliability for the observer pairs was .88. For purposes of analysis,
the average ratings on the 12 Bales categories were combined to form four types
of responses: positive social-emotional (agreeing
,
joking, showing, solidarity),
negative social-emotional (disagreeing, showing tension- showing antagonism),
directive (giving information, opinions, cr suggestions), and nondirective
(asking for information, opinions, or suggestions).
The number of five minute periods used in arriving at a consensus (with a
deadlock coded as seven) served as an index of group performance.
The post task questionnaire contained nine-point Likcrt scales for measur-
ing perceptions of members' information ar'1 role (two items apiece), interper-
sonal influence (one scale for each group member including oneself) , satis-
faction with the task (two items), and satisfaction with the decision (five
items)
. Each set of satisfaction items was averaged for purposes of data
analysis. Self- and peer -ratings of task effectiveness were measured by a
20-point behaviorally anchored rating scale. Perceptions of the amount of
influence and effectiveness in the group were determined by averaging the self-
and peer-ratings.
RESULTS
The data were analyzed by two (information) by two (role) by two (se3
analyses of variance. The manipulations were effective in that subjects

sect Ly perceived metaber differences in information and role when they ex-
isted. The means, standard deviations, and results of the analyses of variance
lor the dependent variables are presented in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about hare
The proportions of both positive and negative social-emotional responses
were srr ?nif icantly greater for members of homogeneous groups than for members
of heterogeneous groups, Males ware higher in directive responses chan females
(£ < «>06), A significant role by sex interaction for directive responses and
subsequent post hoc analyses demonstrated that males were significantly higher
ixi directive responses than females in the representational role condition
2x difference occurred in the nonrepresentational role condition.
- nt information by role interaction emerged for negative social-
emotional responses. Within the representational role condition, homogeneous
group members emitted a greater proportion of negative responses than hetero-
ious group members, whereas no difference occurred between information con-
.thin nourepresentational role g-oups. finally, a significant three-
interaction for nondirective responses resulted from the single significant
les exhibiting more nondirective responses than females in the
.^s inforx ation-representational role condition.
. s of the number of group segments used showed that female groups
If icantly longer to reach agreeraenc than male groups. The information
action demonstrated that female groups tended to take longer than
roups under the heterogeneous information condition but not under the
formation condition (js < .C'j).
A significantly greater amount of influence was perceived by heterogeneous
members than by homogeneous ,iroup members. The amount of perceived task
effective as significantly greater for in th~ nonrepresentational

role groups than those in the representational role groups. Satisfaction with
the task vas higher in representational than nonrepresentational groups
(p_ < .06) and significantly higher for me^es than for females. Satisfaction
with the decision was higher in the nonrepresentational than representational
groups (p_ < .09) and higher for males then for females <£ < .06).
DISCUSSION
The increased task demands resulting from representation role obligations
were expected to compound the difficulty in arriving at a solution brought
about by information heterogeneity. Positive and negative social-emotional
responses were more frequent in homogeneous than heterogeneous information
groups. Members of representational role groups reported lower member task
satisfaction, lower satisfaction with the decision, and higher satisfaction
with the task than members of nonrepresentational role groups. The lower
frequency of positive and negative social-emotional responses and the higher
amount of perceived influence in heterogeneous groups than homogeneous groups
indicate that information heterogeneity may foster communication of different
viewpoints while inhibiting expressions ox agreement and disagreement.
The findings demonstrated that the sex of group members, moderated by
the role and information conditions, was an important determine-*- of group
process and outcome. The higher proportion of directive and nondirective
responses for males supports results found for sex in coalition formation
(Murnighan, Note 1; Uesugi & Vinacke, 1963), bargaining (Callahan, Messe, &
Vallacher, Note 2), and group decisionmaking (see Shaw, 1971, pp. 162-175
for a review) which indicate that males are more task oriented than females.
The finding that females took longer to reach agreement implies that females
may be more conservative or perhaps less trusting of other females than males
in same-sex groups. This result may be due to socially desirable norms for

female behavior or simply less female Interest in the nuclear power siting
problem.
The results have implications for the assembly and leadership of task
forces such as community action groups, interdisciplinary research teams, com-
mittees in business and government, etc. Recruiting individuals who have the
same information or asking members to share as much relevant information as
possible either in writing or orally before the group deals with alternative
solutions may facilitate the expression of social-emotional responses (both
agreement and disagreement) earlier in the life of the group. Although not
demonstrated in the present study, the strategy of quickly communicating
relevant information may result in a more effective outcome than when infor-
mation is not immediately shared (Hackman S Kaplan, 1974). Furthermore, em-
phasizing a common goal or purpose among group members with different, possibly
latent vested interests could increase effectiveness by promoting discussion
and lessening the steadfast adherence to fixed positions which can occur in
negotiation processes. Lastly, the sex differences in task-orientation and
time to reach agreement suggest that research is necessary on the effects of
different leadership strategies in male and female groups.

Reference Notes
1* Murnighan, K. J. Coalition behavior in decision making groups. Unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Purdue University, 1974.
2* Callahan, Charlene M« , Messe, L. A,, & Vallacher, Robin R. The effects
of sex and perception of inputs on bargaining behavior. Presented at
the Midwestern Psychological Association Meeting, Chicago, 1975.
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Footnotes
Requests for reprints should be sent to Manuel London, Department of
Business Administration, University of Illinois, 61 Commerce West, Urbana,
Illinois 61801.
The instructions, maps, and other experimental materials may be ob-
tained from the author.
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